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Abstract
This paper addresses a task in Interactive Task Learning (Laird et  al. IEEE Intell Syst 
32:6–21, 2017). The agent must learn to build towers which are constrained by rules, and 
whenever the agent performs an action which violates a rule the teacher provides ver-
bal corrective feedback: e.g. “No, red blocks should be on blue blocks”. The agent must 
learn to build rule compliant towers from these corrections and the context in which they 
were given. The agent is not only ignorant of the rules at the start of the learning process, 
but it also has a deficient domain model, which lacks the concepts in which the rules are 
expressed. Therefore an agent that takes advantage of the linguistic evidence must learn the 
denotations of neologisms and adapt its conceptualisation of the planning domain to incor-
porate those denotations. We show that by incorporating constraints on interpretation that 
are imposed by discourse coherence into the models for learning (Hobbs in On the coher-
ence and structure of discourse, Stanford University, Stanford, 1985; Asher et al. in Logics 
of conversation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), an agent which utilizes 
linguistic evidence outperforms a strong baseline which does not.
Keywords Human robot interaction · Interactive learning · Knowledge representation and 
reasoning
1 Introduction
The nascent field of Interactive Task Learning (ITL) aims to develop agents that can learn 
arbitrary new tasks through a combination of their own actions in the environment and 
an ongoing interaction with a teacher (see Laird et al. [41] for a recent survey). A current 
assumption for many AI systems is that any capabilities required can be programmed and 
trained prior to deployment. However, this assumption may be untenable for tasks that con-
tain a vast array of contingencies. It is also problematic if the task is one where unforeseen 
changes to what constitutes successful behaviour can occur after an agent is deployed: for 
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instance, tasks where the set of possible options, or the specifications that govern correct 
behaviour, can change at any given time. Motivated by such issues, ITL seeks to create 
agents that can learn after they are deployed, through situated interactions which are natu-
ral to the human domain expert that they interact with.
Although interaction can take many forms, such as demonstration through imitation or 
teleoperation [6], our interest lies in approaches that make use of natural language to teach 
agents. A common formulation of such a learning process is as a situated and extended dis-
course between teacher and agent, much like one between a teacher and apprentice. Dur-
ing this discourse, the teacher provides instructions [55], describes current states [33] and 
defines concepts [53], goals [38], and actions [55], while the agent asks clarifying ques-
tions [54] and executes the instructed commands. Existing ITL systems that adopt these 
approaches tend to assume that the teacher’s utterances are unambiguous, and that any 
uncertainty or lack of knowledge can be detected by the agent and rectified through asking 
relevant questions (e.g. [54, 55]). There is also an assumption that the teacher’s guidance 
is geared towards what the agent should do now, rather than what the agent just got wrong. 
This emphasis effectively places a burden on teachers to recall and provide all the informa-
tion that’s required to perform the next appropriate action before the teacher observes the 
agent’s attempts to do it. To alleviate or recover from that burden, it would be useful to 
support, and learn from, a dialogue move where the teacher expresses why the agent’s lat-
est action was suboptimal, or incorrect.
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in ITL. In our task, the agent starts out with only 
partial knowledge of the goal that is a part of its planning problem. The true goal is for all 
blocks to be placed in a tower (the agent knows this) but there are additional constraints 
which place requirements on the final tower (e.g., each red block must be on a blue block), 
and the agent is ignorant of these additional constraints. It is also unaware of the domain 
level concepts (in our case, colours) that define them, and the natural language words that 
refer to them. We assume the teacher was unable to provide the agent with an exhaus-
tive description of these constraints prior to deployment—due, for example, to issues with 
recall, unforeseen changes to the requirements or environment, etc. This assumption cre-
ates a natural context for a teacher to utter a particular kind of speech act, namely cor-
rection (e.g., “No, red blocks should be on blue blocks”). As we mentioned, this type of 
speech act—where the teacher expresses a specification of correct behaviour that has just 
been violated—hasn’t been well studied in an ITL setting before. Our aim is to show that 
corrections are a useful source of evidence in ITL, in contexts where the agent needs to 
learn the goal that is a part of its planning problem, as well as how to ground concepts.1
The communicative intention of a correction is to change the beliefs or intentions of 
the corrected party [8]. In a purely verbal dialogue, a correction rejects parts of a previ-
ous utterance and (optionally) introduces alternative content, perceived by the corrector to 
be more accurate than the content of the corrected utterance. For example, in the simple 
dialogue below, utterance (1b) rejects who ate the last sandwich, but not that it was eaten: 
1 ITL has been used to learn novel actions, novel concepts that define the hypothesis space of possible 
states, and optimal policies. Here, we restrict attention to only the latter two learning tasks; we do not 
address using corrections to learn novel actions or motor skills.
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(1) a. “Mary ate the last sandwich”
b. “No, it was Tom”
 In the corrections we cover in this paper, the correction denies not aspects of a prior 
verbal utterance, but rather aspects of the latest physical action that’s been performed by 
the agent. Specifically, it is rejecting that action from being part of a valid plan, given the 
constraints that define the planning problem. The dialogue move we focus on in this paper 
provides an explanation of why the action was rejected, by stating which constraint (or 
specification) was violated. Specifications that govern commercial processes can be con-
ventions that appear quite arbitrary, rather than justified or motivated from commonsense 
knowledge. Specifications of the latter kind include those concerning health and safety, but 
there are many of the former kind that are designed simply to ensure consistency in the 
way people perform complex tasks on a production line (e.g., Amazon has a specification 
that packages containing batteries must have the package label on the left). So this paper 
ignores the task of learning specifications via commonsense knowledge and inference. It 
also doesn’t address dialogue moves where the teacher justifies or explains why a particular 
specification exists. We focus instead on the agent learning specifications or constraints 
that appear arbitrary—in our case, they are expressed in terms of colour—and we address 
how the agent exploits its (uncertain) beliefs about specifications and how they apply in the 
current domain state during planning.
Previous work on task learning using correction has covered only simple “yes/no” feed-
back [39] or one word feedback paired with demonstrations [51]. This previous work shows 
the value of providing corrective feedback to the agent’s latest action. Our contribution is 
to expand the scope of such moves, to consider utterances where the feedback contains 
actual linguistic content that describes the source of the agent’s error, but which requires 
the acquisition of grounded language understanding to interpret. Dealing with the ground-
ing problem in the context of correction introduces challenges which previous grounding 
work has not needed to contend with. For speech acts such as instruction and description, 
the content of the utterance is always a partial description of the non-verbal context. More 
technically, the non-verbal state satisfies the truth conditions of the speaker’s utterance (or, 
in the case of instructions is a valid initial state for carrying out the described action). But 
this isn’t the case with what Asher et al. [8] call divergent speech acts, such as corrections. 
With these speech acts, as we observed above in (1), the content of the correction and 
the item it corrects are mutually inconsistent. For instance, when the teacher corrects an 
agent’s latest action by saying “No, that should be a blue block”, the agent should infer that 
the denotation of the demonstrative “that” is not a blue block. In other words, it generates a 
negative training exemplar for grounding blue, not a positive one. More generally, in learn-
ing to ground symbols from corrections, the agent must infer what part of its latest action is 
being denied, and generate appropriate training exemplars—both positive and negative—
from that (for details, see Sect. 4).
2  Related work
Interactive Task learning (ITL) aims to exploit interaction to support autonomous deci-
sion making during planning [41]. Similar to Kirk and Laird [38], our aim is to provide 
the agent with information about goals and concepts that allow it to construct a formal 
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representation of the decision problem, which standard decision making algorithms can 
then solve. The teacher does not provide a specific plan (as in e.g., Nicolescu and Mataric 
[50], She et al. [55]), but rather the information needed to infer a valid plan in a large range 
of contingencies. In our case we focus on learning goals which could arise from any num-
ber of sources, not just common sense knowledge or health and safety, but also apparently 
arbitrary regulations that enforce consistency across those performing the same task. The 
learned constraints are added to the goal description in PDDL, although it is conceivable 
that the learned constraints could be added in other ways, e.g. as done in Answer Set Pro-
gramming for common sense rules Erdem et al. [19, 20]. We extend previous work in ITL 
by supporting a novel but natural way in which to express this information, namely correc-
tive dialogue moves that highlight an aspect of the goal that’s violated by the agent’s latest 
action.
Corrections change the nature of the inferences an agent must make when learning to 
solve its task. In prior ITL tasks, utterances are usually asserted in a context where their 
intended contents are satisfied (e.g., [38]). Most approaches assume the teacher’s utterance 
is either a request to perform a specific action (e.g., [3]), or it describes the current state 
(e.g., [42, 56, 57, 60]), or both are supported [48]. This means the non-linguistic context 
provides a positive example for learning to interpret the teacher’s assertion: for instance, 
the agent can infer from the instruction “Put a red block on a blue block” that there is a 
red block and a blue block in the current visual scene that satisfy the preconditions of the 
put action, and its task in updating its model of symbol grounding is to estimate those 
positive exemplars from that scene, and update its grounding parameters with that positive 
evidence. However, for corrections, the current state is a situation where it is impossible to 
achieve the teacher’s expressed goal without reversing the most recent action. For example, 
if the corrective move is “No, pick up only blue blocks”, then the agent must infer that the 
block it just picked up is not blue—i.e., it’s a negative examplar for grounding the word 
“blue”. Inferring what aspect of the context caused the goal to be violated can be complex 
(see Sect. 4). But it’s triggered by a very natural dialogue strategy for teachers to use—i.e., 
correcting a learner by expressing what caused the latest action to be a mistake. Develop-
ing methods that benefit from this type of evidence is the main aim of this paper.
Using natural language (NL) is a natural way for humans to communicate. It can pro-
vide evidence in a more data efficient manner than non-verbal demonstration alone: even 
simple yes/no feedback can be used to learn a reward function [39] or to trigger specific 
types of learning algorithms for correcting bad behaviour [51]. But dealing with more 
extended NL phrases raises additional challenges. First, it is necessary to map NL strings 
into formal semantic representations or logical forms that support inference (e.g., [63, 67]). 
As in prior ITL systems, (e.g., [22, 45]) we assume our agent begins with the ability to 
analyse the syntax of a sentence, but syntax doesn’t resolve semantic scope ambiguities or 
lexical senses [13]. So while linguistic syntax restricts the possible logical forms to a finite 
set, the agent must use the context of utterance to identify which logical form matches the 
speaker’s intended meaning.
Thanks to its knowledge of linguistic syntax and semantic compositionality, the agent 
is able to parse unforeseen words—i.e. neologisms—into predicate symbols of the cor-
rect arity. However, mapping NL utterances to semantic representations isn’t sufficient 
for ITL. The agent must also learn to recognize the denotations of any newly added 
predicate symbols. In an embodied setting, this means estimating the set of percept val-
ues associated with those denotations. In other words, a mapping between the continu-
ous percept space and discrete symbols must be found. This is the symbol grounding 
problem [16, 27]. Within artificial systems it has also been called the anchoring problem 
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[15], although anchoring takes into account additional difficulties, such as maintaining 
an estimate of an object’s position, even when it becomes occluded by other objects. In 
this paper we deal only with the basic problem of mapping visual features to specific 
concepts—all objects in the scene remain completely visible at all times to our agent.
There are two main approaches to solving the grounding problem. In the first, the 
connection between language and vision is made through latent structures, usually neu-
ral models, without observing or explicitly inferring connections between individual 
words in the NL utterance and structures within the other modality, such as specific 
objects (e.g. [49, 56, 57]). The second approach is to build explicit classifiers for indi-
vidual words and concepts, which are then combined with methods for joining these 
classifiers together to provide meanings of extended linguistic expressions via princi-
ples of semantic compositionality (e.g., [22, 40, 42, 48, 65]). This second approach has 
been the traditional choice in developing robot systems that learn to interpret instruc-
tions [17, 22, 40] (although see also Karamcheti et al. [36], Al-Omari et al. [2], Ander-
son et al. [3]). In this paper, we adopt the second approach.
Any number of different models can be used to perform this symbol grounding, 
such as SVMs [59, 66], Nearest Neighbor classifiers [17], and Deep Neural Models 
[34, 62]. New concepts can also be described in terms of previously grounded words—
e.g. “a medicine box is a white box with a cross on it” [53]. We do not propose a new 
approach to symbol grounding per se. Rather, our interest lies in modelling how symbol 
grounding can be acquired from interactions. Specifically, we focus on scenarios where 
grounding is updated online from human-robot interaction, rather than batch-learned on 
a pre-defined dataset. Previous methods all focus on learning from interactions which 
somehow define or label particular objects in the scene through, for example, describ-
ing an action [33], pointing and providing a label [9, 18, 23], or playing I Spy [60]. Our 
novelty lies in introducing corrections and modelling their interaction between symbol 
grounding and the semantic constraints imposed by discourse coherence—that is, that 
the speaker’s message must be in a specific coherence relation, such as correction, to 
some part of the context [8, 28, 47] (see Sects. 4 and 5 for how we use discourse coher-
ence to restrict the interpretation of the language). In fact, our methods should work for 
any symbol grounding model with the following properties: (1) the output of the model 
is a probability distribution; (2) the model can be updated incrementally, as and when 
new evidence is observed; and (3) it supports supervised learning that is both noisy (i.e. 
some labels in the training data may be incorrect) and weak (i.e., it copes with latent 
mappings from natural language words to the region in the visual scene where its deno-
tation is located).
In this paper we will assume that dialogue management and primitive motor skills 
are fixed and known in advance, and we focus on learning complex plans. The learner 
must update its beliefs about the goal of its planning problem and how its visual per-
cepts reveal what’s true of the current domain state, based on the evidence provided by 
its own actions and interactions with the teacher. It then uses established planning algo-
rithms to infer a valid plan, given those beliefs about the goal, and the current domain 
state given its visual percepts. Our approach is novel compared with prior work in ITL 
in that we exploit formal semantic models of discourse coherence [29, 37, 43] to inform 
learning. We show how the semantics of discourse coherence can be leveraged to sup-
port learning for a type of dialogue move that has so far been ignored in ITL: the teacher 
corrects the agent’s latest action by specifying the constraint that it violates.
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3  The task
The task takes place in a blocks world where each planning problem instance consists of 
10 coloured blocks that must be placed into 1-3 towers. The agent has access to a PDDL 
domain definition which describes the action put(x, y) which places object x on object y 
and unstack(x, y) which removes x from y and places x back on the table. Prior to interac-
tion and learning, the agent also has access to a PDDL problem description as shown in 
Fig. 7: it includes an initial state in which 10 individual objects are clear and on the table, 
and a goal that all blocks must be in a tower. But while both these representations of the 
initial state and goal are satisfied in the ground truth planning problem, critical information 
is missing: the true goal includes further constraints (e.g., that each red block must be on a 
blue block); and the initial state not only lacks information about which blocks are which 
colours, but perhaps more fundamentally, the predicate symbols corresponding to colour 
terms are not a part of the agent’s vocabulary for defining the set of possible states at all. 
Instead, a file is included which contains the RGB value of each object in the problem 
description. In our simulations, these RGB values were randomly generated for each object 
from a Gaussian distribution with mean and variance chosen to generate colours which 
match a particular concept (see Sect. 6 for details),2 and the agent can observe these RGB 
values for each object, henceforth referred to as F(x). The domain and problem is written 
in PDDL for the MetricFF planner and conforms to STRIPS with the addition of quantified 
goals and numeric fluents as defined in PDDL 2 and supported by MetricFF, as shown in 
Fig. 7.
Solving planning problems in general is PSPACE-complete Bylander [11] while blocks 
world problems are NP-complete Gupta and Nau [26]. Planning with the FF planner is NP-
complete in general but in situations where there are no deadends (i.e. states from which 
there is no valid plan to the goal) it is O(n3) Hoffmann and Nebel [32].
As we mentioned earlier, the true planning problem, which the agent must solve, 
includes additional constraints, expressed as quantified statements in the goal description. 
The agent starts out ignorant of these constraints. Further, the (colour) predicate symbols 
that feature in the constraints and their denotations are respectively not a part of the agent’s 
vocabulary for defining the planning problem or a part of its domain model. These con-
straints specify conditions that must be true of the towers once completed, as described in 
Table 1 and Eqs. 1–3. Generalising from the example rules in Table 1 to rules involving 
any colour terms and numbers, we consider rules of three forms:
where c, c1 and c2 are colours (e.g., red, blue, maroon) and n is an integer—specifically 
n ∈ {1, 2, 3} . In words, r1 and r2 constrain the colours of blocks that are in an on relation: 
(1)rc1,c21 = ∀x ⋅ c1(x)→ ∃y ⋅ c2(y) ∧ on(x, y)
3
(2)rc1,c22 = ∀y ⋅ c2(y) → ∃x ⋅ c1(x) ∧ on(x, y)
4
(3)rc,n3 = ∀t ⋅ (tower(t)→ count(c, t) ≤ n)
5
2 The colours are generated from an HSV space where mean and variance in the Hue dimension have been 
selected for concepts such as red and green with Saturation and Value mean and variance remaining con-
stant for all colour concepts
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for instance, rred,blue
1
 means that every red block must be on a blue block, while rred,blue
2
 
means that every blue block must have a red block on it. Constraints of the form r3 limit 
the number of blocks of a particular colour c in all towers to at most n: for instance, rred,3
3
 
means that the number of red blocks in any tower t must be less than or equal to 3. The 
rules constrain the final tower. However, due to their nature and the nature of the available 
actions, if one of them is violated by a put action it will remain violated unless that put 
action is undone by an unstack action.
A simulated teacher observes the agent attempting to build the towers. Every time the agent 
takes an action that breaks one or more of the rules in G (i.e., the action must be undone 
in any valid plan to achieve G), the teacher provides verbal feedback, expressed in natural 
language—e.g., “no, put red blocks on blue blocks” (for rules of the form r1 and r2 ) or “no, 
you can only have two red blocks in a tower” (for rules of the form r3 ). The feedback serves to 
correct the agent’s mistake, and it provides an explanation as to why the action was incorrect. 
However, the verbal component may be ambiguous between several rules (see Table 1 and 
Sect. 4 for details). Thus, the agent must disambiguate the teacher’s intended message while 
simultaneously learning to ground new terms in the embodied environment—the latter task 
amounts to learning which RGB values are members of which colour concepts (see Fig. 1).
4  Dialogue coherence
The agent learns to solve its planning problem via the teacher’s dialogue moves. To sim-
plify matters we assume that the teacher is coherent (that is, a specific coherence relation 
connects her utterance to its context), sincere (i.e. she believes what she says) and compe-
tent (i.e. what she believes is true). In other words we assume that the teacher will always 
give well-timed feedback (ie, she utters a correction as soon as the agent makes a mistake) 
and the feedback will always be true. In this study we do not deal with possibility that the 
teacher’s message may be fallible.
For the purpose of this study, the teacher and learner share an understanding of the 
teacher’s dialogue strategy, which is the following: if the agent performs a put action a that 
must be undone (via unstack) in any valid plan for reaching the goal G, then the teacher 
will correct the learner’s action by uttering one of the corrective utterances u described in 
Tables 1 and 2 (which u she utters in which embodied context is expanded on in this sec-
tion). That u corrects a is written Corr(a, u) , and the agent observes this move.
When an utterance u is used to correct an action a, written Corr(a, u) , then according to 
Lascarides and Asher [44], the semantics of Corr(a, u) entails the following: (a) the con-
tent of u is true (in other words, Corr is a right-veridical relation), and (b) the content of u 
negates some part of the corrected action a. Given our assumptions about speaker coher-
ence, sincerity and competence, the semantic consequences of a speaker’s dialogue moves 
are actually true. In other words, for the purposes of this study, all of the following are 
equivalent: content that’s entailed by a dialogue move, content that the speaker intended 
to express, and content that’s actually true. In our task, since the teacher is correcting the 
agent’s latest action a = put(o1, o2) , any correction u of a conveys that a must be undone 
(via the unstack action) in any valid plan (thus denying that it is part of a correct plan). So 
even if u were simply the cue phrase “no”, signalling that it’s a correction move, Corr(a, u) 
entails that there is some rule r, which is a part of the goal G, that cannot be satisfied by the 
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outcome state s of the action a or any state s′ that’s reachable from s without first undoing 
a—in this case, we say that r is violated by a, written V(r, a). We will define more precisely 
the various ways in which an action a can violate the rules r that feature in Table 1 shortly.
As we mentioned earlier, the teacher’s correction moves u consist of more than the word 
“no”. They also provide an explanation as to why the teacher said “no”, by expressing 
which rule r was violated by the action: e.g., “No, red blocks should be on blue blocks”. 
However, as shown in Table 1, the correcting utterance u is ambiguous as to which rule r 
the speaker intended to express: its linguistic form yields a set M(u) of rules which could 
be meant by the utterance u, that set may consist of more than one rule, and which one of 
these the speaker actually intended to convey is hidden to the agent. So in our study, the 
corrective move Corr(a, u) is satisfied if and only if one of the rules r ∈ M(u) is both a part 
of the goal G and violated by a (meaning a must be undone in any plan to achieve r):
Table 1  The teacher’s natural language utterances, mapped to the set of possible constraints that they 
express
Specific colours and numbers can be replaced with other colours and numbers. The linguistic forms of two 
of the utterances do not fully determine the constraint the speaker intended to express. Conversely, it is 
possible to express a constraint in more than one way, although we only support a limited set of natural lan-
guage surface forms in our experiments
NL Symbol Logical form
Put red blocks on blue blocks rred,blue
1
∀x.red(x)→ ∃y.blue(y) ∧ on(x, y)
r
red,blue
2
∀y.blue(y)→ ∃x.red(x) ∧ on(x, y)
Red blocks should be on blue blocks rred,blue
1
∀x.red(x)→ ∃y.blue(y) ∧ on(x, y)
r
red,blue
2
∀y.blue(y)→ ∃x.red(x) ∧ on(x, y)
Put no more than 3 blue blocks in a tower rblue,3
3
∀t.(tower(t) → count(blue, t) ≤ 3)
Fig. 1  The colours of objects 
fit into a number of different 
colour terms. Each individual 
instance of a colour is generated 
from a Gaussian distribution 
in HSV space, with mean and 
variance selected to produce 
colours described using a chosen 
category. The colour words used 
allow for high level categories 
such as “red” and “green” as well 
as more specific categories such 
as “maroon”. This figure shows 
examples of hues generated 
in each category, including an 
example of a hue that fits both 
into the red and maroon catego-
ries (Color figure online)
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Equation (4) follows directly from the truth conditional semantics of correction and the 
assumption that the speaker is sincere, competent and coherent. The compositional seman-
tics of u, combined with the speaker’s sincerity and competence, means that there must 
be some rule r ∈ M(u) that’s true; and further, given our task, r being true is equivalent to 
r ∈ G . Further, if a doesn’t violate the rule r, then the speaker failed to coherently explain 
why she used the word “no”, to signal correction—for instance, a constraint that each red 
block should be on a blue block cannot coherently explain why putting a yellow block on 
a green block is a mistake, because the former isn’t inconsistent with the latter. But which 
rule r ∈ M(u) satisfies the conjunction in (4) is not determined by u’s linguistic form alone: 
the agent must estimate it via the embodied context of utterance.
As shown in Table 1, the utterance u that the teacher says is the same if rred,blue
1
 is vio-
lated or if rred,blue
2
 is. In both cases the teacher will utter u1 = “no, red blocks should be 
on blue blocks” (or its paraphrase, for this task at least, of “no, put red blocks on blue 
blocks”). If rred,1
3
 is violated, the teacher says u2 = “no, you can only have one red block 
in any tower”. Finally, in a situation where neither rred,blue
1
 (or rred,blue
2
 ) nor rred,1
3
 is violated 
in isolation, but their combination is violated, meaning that the most recent action must 
be undone to complete a valid tower, then the teacher says u3 = “no, you can only have 
on red block in any tower, and red blocks must be on blue blocks” (see Sect. 5.2.7). We’ll 
now discuss these in more detail, exploring how the truth conditions of coherent corrective 
moves, and in particular the conditions under which V(a, r) is satisfied, impose constraints 
on the relationship between the speaker’s communicative intent and the colours of various 
blocks in the visual scene. We do this in order to identify what the agent can infer when it 
observes one of the corrections u1 , u2 , or u3.
4.1  Red blocks should be on blue blocks
When the teacher says “no, red blocks should be on blue blocks” this is ambiguous between 
the rules rred,blue
1
 and rred,blue
2
 (henceforth shortened to rr,b
1
 and rr,b
2
 ). The agent therefore 
needs to figure out which of the two rules was actually violated, in order to learn accurate 
information from the correction.3
In accordance with Eq. 4, an utterance is only used to correct an action if one of the 
rules which it could convey is both in the goal and is violated by that action. Therefore, 
since the possible messages of u1 are rr,b1  and r
r,b
2
 , at least one of them must be in the goal 
and violated by the action a:
(4)Corr(a, u) ↔
⋁
ri∈M(u)
(ri ∈ G ∧ V(ri, a))
(5)Corr(a, u1) ↔ (rr,b1 ∈ G ∧ V(r
r,b
1
, a)) ∨ (rr,b
2
∈ G ∧ V(rr,b
2
, a))
3 It would be possible to resolve this ambiguity through prosodic stress [52]. With capitals indicating 
stress, “no, red blocks should be on BLUE blocks” resolves to rr,b,
1
 and “no, RED blocks should be on blue 
blocks” resolves to rr,b
2
 . However, current automated speech recognizers do not reliably map prosodic stress 
to information about focus (and there is little consensus on how this should be done [10, 12]). Furthermore, 
ambiguity is an inherent in natural language and generally unavoidable, and so we purposefully ensure that 
the observed linguistic form leaves this ambiguity unresolved, so that we can study how it can be resolved 
by relating the utterance and its set of possible meanings to the context in which the utterance was made.
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As mentioned earlier, saying u1 = “No, red blocks should be on blue blocks” would be 
incoherent if the action a was somehow irrelevant to the possible messages rr,b
1
 and rr,b
2
 , 
such as placing a green block on a yellow block.
Rules such as rr,b
1
 and rr,b
2
 can be violated in two different ways. First of all, in what 
we call a Direct violation, consider S1 in Fig. 2. If rr,b1 ∈ G , then an action resulting in 
S1 would directly violate the rule since rr,b1  requires each red block to be on a blue block, 
but here a red block was put on a non-blue block. This Direct violation is expressed as 
(6), and similarly S2 directly violates rr,b2  because of (7):
Rule rr,b
1
 is not directly violated in S2 nor is rr,b2  directly violated in S1 . However, they illus-
trate the second kind of violation. These rules are respectively what we call Indirectly vio-
lated: the towers themselves do not violate the rule, but it is now impossible to create rule-
compliant towers, given the remaining blocks on the table, without first undoing that latest 
action. In S2 , rr,b1  is indirectly violated because by putting a non-red block on the blue one, 
the learner created a situation where there are more red blocks on the table than blue ones, 
and so one of those remaining red blocks has nowhere to go. S1 indirectly violates rr,b2  for 
similar reasons. Indirectly violating rr,b
2
 can also happen if a places a red block in a tower 
after first placing a blue block in a second tower, resulting in a similar lack of red blocks 
to complete the tower with the blue block. These indirect violations of the rules are regi-
mented as follows:
When uttering u1 , our teacher helps the agent to determine which of these two types of 
violation has happened by pointing at the tower that the learner has just added a block to 
if it’s a Direct violation VD , and pointing at a block that can no longer be a part of a rule-
compliant tower if it’s an Indirect violation VI . So if rr,b1  is indirectly violated, then the 
teacher points at a red block on the table. If rr,b
2
 is indirectly violated, the teacher points to 
a blue block, either on the table or on the top of a tower, which no longer has a red block to 
be placed on top of it to conform with the rule.
If the agent can ground the colour terms “red”, and/or “blue”, then it could use the 
coherence Eqs.  6–9 to infer whether the teacher intended to convey rr,b
1
 or rr,b
2
 . Con-
versely, if the agent knew which message the teacher intended to convey, then the agent 
could infer the colour of the relevant objects. However our agent may not know the 
intended message nor know how to ground the relevant colour terms. In this case we 
allow the agent to utter a query whose response will resolve the ambiguity. The above 
(6)VD(rr,b1 , put(o1)) ↔ (red(o1) ∧ ¬blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2))
(7)VD(rr,b2 , put(o1)) ↔ (¬red(o1) ∧ blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2))
(8)
VI(r
r,b
1
, put(o1, o2)) ↔ (¬red(o1) ∧ blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2)∧
|{x ∶ red(x) ∧ on(x, table)}| > |{y ∶ blue(o4) ∧ on(y, table)}|)
(9)
VI(r
r,b
2
, put(o1, o2))↔ (red(o1) ∧ ¬blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2)∧
(|{x ∶ blue(x) ∧ on(x, table)}| > |{y ∶ red(y) ∧ on(y, table)}|)∨
∃x∃t(blue(x) ∧ tower(t) ∧ top(t, x)∧
|{x ∶ blue(x) ∧ on(x, table)}| ≥
|{y ∶ red(y) ∧ on(y, table)}|))
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coherence equations ensure that determining the colour of one of the available blocks 
would be sufficient to infer the correct interpretation; thus the agent asks a simple yes/
no question about the colour of a block: for example, “is the block I just placed red?”. 
By the above equations, the answer, whether “yes” or “no”, is sufficient for the agent to 
infer both the speaker’s intended message and the colours of the relevant blocks.
4.2  Goals with colour count rules of the form r
3
In an extension to the planning problems we considered in Appelgren and Lascarides [5], 
we now contemplate a further type of rule that can be a part of the goal G—see (3). Add-
ing rules of this form creates situations where no individual rule in the goal G is violated 
by the latest action, indirectly or otherwise; however, conjunctions of rules in G are. In 
Sects.  5 and  6, we’ll explore how the approach taken in Appelgren and Lascarides [5] 
scales to these more complex situations.
Specifically, consider corrective moves of the form u2 = “No, you can only have one red 
block in any tower”. Unlike u1 , there is only one rule in the set of possible messages of this 
utterance, namely rr,1
3
.4 However, the challenge with adding rules of the form r3 to G lies in 
the more complex ways in which they can be violated by the latest action, and how one can 
leverage information about grounding colour terms in spite of the added complexity.
There are two ways in which the rule rr,1
3
 can be violated by the latest action a. The first 
is when the learner puts a red block on top of a tower t that already has a red block in it; see 
S3 in Fig. 3. This Direct violation is formalised in (10), where a = put(o1, o2):
(10)
VD(r
r,1
3
, put(o1, o2))↔ red(o1) ∧ ∃x∃t(tower(t) ∧ in(o1, t) ∧ in(x, t) ∧ red(x)
∧ ∀y(in(y, t) ∧ x ≠ y) → ¬red(y))
Fig. 2  Two states which violate rred,blue
1
 or rred,blue
2
 either directly or indirectly
4 Utterance u3 generates semantic scope ambiguities, but none of the alternative resolutions match any of 
the three rules we consider here.
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In words, the top block o1 is red, and exactly one of the blocks already in the tower is also 
red. This contrasts with direct violations of rules r1 and r2—these rules constrain the col-
ours of only the top two blocks, rather than the colours of all blocks in the tower. However, 
the agent cannot tell in advance of the learning process whether utilizing the information 
in the second (existentially quantified) conjunct to learn symbol grounding is worthwhile 
(in that it improves data efficiency). Thus, whether it is worth utilizing a monotonic entail-
ment of a dialogue move is an empirical matter. In Sect. 6, we’ll present experiments that 
explore the trade off between exploiting monotonic entailments about speaker meaning and 
data efficiency in learning the task (see experiment 4).
The second way in which the action a may violate rr,1
3
 is when a doesn’t create a tower 
with more than one red block; however, there is another rule in G which will be violated 
by the tower unless another red block is added to it. In other words, a can (indirectly) vio-
late the conjunction of rr,1
3
 and another rule or the form rr,x
1
 or rr,x
2
 for some colour x, even 
though it doesn’t violate either rule in isolation. For example, suppose that rr,b
2
 and rr,1
3
 are 
both a part of the goal G. Suppose, furthermore, that the agent has already put a red block 
in a tower, and now it puts a blue block on top of that tower. The agent cannot now satisfy 
both rules without first undoing a: either it now places a red block on top thereby satisfy-
ing rr,b
2
 but (directly) violating rr,1
3
 ; or it doesn’t, in which case it (directly) violates rr,b
2
 . The 
combination rr,1
3
∧ rr,b
1
 can also be violated by this situation, if there are not enough blue 
blocks left to place any remaining red blocks on, thus forcing the agent to add a red block 
on top of the blue.
Gricean principles of cooperative conversation [25] predict that if the situation is one 
where the conjunction of two rules is not achievable from the current state, but either con-
junct is, then the speaker should utter the conjunction as their corrective move, not just one 
of the conjuncts. This is because to mention only one conjuncts carries, via the Gricean 
maxims, a scalar implicature that this rule alone cannot be achieved from the current state, 
and in the situations we’re considering this is misleading. Indeed, the above semantics 
for correcting actions with utterances u1 and u2 carry those scalar implicatures, following 
the formal semantics of correction in Lascarides and Asher [44]. Therefore, in order to 
reflect how human speakers reason about scalar implicatures when choosing what to say, 
the teacher uses the utterance u2 when r3 is violated in isolation, but expresses the conjunc-
tion of rules when the conjunction is violated but neither conjunct in isolation is: e.g., u3 = 
“no, red blocks should be on blue blocks and you can only have one red block in each 
tower”. Since the agent and teacher share the knowledge that this is the teacher’s strategy 
(in essence, they are both following the Gricean maxims of conversation), the agent can 
make inferences about the colours of blocks from the teacher’s signal. When the teacher 
utters u2 or u3 , the agent can (monotonically) infer that the tower that the agent just added a 
block to already has a red block in it. Further if the teacher utters u2 , then the top block that 
the agent just added to the tower is red; if they utter u3 it is blue.
However, the linguistic form of u3 is insufficient to infer whether rr,b1  or r
r,b
2
 is part of the 
goal G, for similar reasons that the linguistic form of u1 is insufficient. Furthermore, unlike 
the situations in Sect. 4.1, the speaker doesn’t use pointing to discriminate between a direct 
violation of r1 (or r2 ) and an indirect violation. In this context, it’s not appropriate to point 
because by definition, the tower itself does not currently violate any rule, and pointing to 
a block on the table that cannot now be added in a goal-compliant manner fails to disam-
biguate the situation. To see this, consider the state S5 in Fig. 4. Suppose that the teacher 
says u3 =“No, put red blocks on blue blocks and there can be at most one red block in any 
given tower” in this state. Then even if the agent knows the colours of all the blocks, it is 
impossible to infer whether rr,1
3
∧ rr,b
1
∈ G or rr,1
3
∧ rr,b
2
∈ G . The latter would be violated 
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by this state, because rr,b
2
 requires you to put a red block on top of the blue one, creating a 
tower with two red blocks thereby violating rr,1
3
 . The former is also violated, because given 
the available blocks on the table, the only way to ensure that each red block is on a blue 
block is to add a red block to the tower, thereby (again) violating rr,1
3
 . Notice that pointing 
to a red block on the table doesn’t really help: in both cases this block cannot be added in a 
rule-compliant manner. On hearing u3 , the agent could attempt to make an informed deci-
sion about whether the rule violated is rr,b
1
 or rr,b
2
 by thinking about in what situations these 
distinct rules would necessitate a red block being placed on the blue block. If rr,b
2
 is a part 
of G, then a red block must be placed onto the tower whatever remains on the table. On the 
other hand, if rr,b
1
 is a part of G, then the teacher would have said u3 only if there are more 
red blocks than blue ones remaining on the table. So counting the number of blue and red 
blocks potentially helps to resolve the ambiguity: if there are fewer or an equal number 
of reds than blues, then rr,b
1
 is violated; otherwise, either rule might be violated. Evaluat-
ing this inference in the visual scene is extremely challenging computationally: the learner 
must evaluate for each block in the scene whether it is red, blue, or neither. We believe 
this represents a poor trade off between performing the inference on the one hand and the 
value of the inferred information for estimating G and symbol grounding on the other. So 
we ignore it here. Nevertheless, our learning agent must disambiguate the (combination) of 
rules that are violated in this situation, even though it currently doesn’t know the colours of 
the blocks. We’ll show how this can be achieved in Sects. 5 and 6.
Table 2  The natural language 
utterances used as examples in 
this section
Symbol Utterance
u1 Red blocks should be on blue blocks
u2 Put no more than 3 blue blocks in a tower
u3 Red blocks should be on blue blocks 
and put no more than 3 blue blocks in 
a tower
u4 That is wrong for the same reason
u5 That is not red either
Fig. 3  Two alternative ways of 
violating r3: on its own (S4) or in 
combination with another ‘red on 
blue’-rule (Color figure online)
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4.3  Using anaphora to resolve ambiguity
The utterances so far receive a coherent interpretation through their connection to the 
agent’s latest action a. However, thanks to the presence of anaphoric expressions, some 
utterances can only be interpreted through their connection to a previous utterance in the 
dialogue. Previous work on anaphora have focused on referring expressions [21, 64]—
in particular pronouns such as “it”—trying to identify particular objects in a scene from 
descriptions such as “in the cluster of orange objects at the bottom, it’s the top object” [21]. 
In this work we focus on anaphoric expressions with richer linguistic content than pro-
nouns: such expressions trigger presuppositions van der Sandt [61], whose context-specific 
interpretations are dependent on identifying how they coherently contribute to the prior 
discourse Asher and Lascarides [7].
Specifically, we consider two utterances with these properties: u4 = “no, that is wrong 
for the same reason” and u5 = “no, that is not red either” (or any other colour). Definite 
descriptions of the form “the same X”, like in u4 , presuppose an antecedent in the context 
that satisfies the description X. The construction “not Y either”, like in u5 , likewise pre-
supposes an antecedent in the context that isn’t Y. Thus utterance u4 presupposes a prior 
(identical) reason (in our task, a rule violation) is a part of the multimodal context; u5 pre-
supposes that something else (in the context) is not red.
In line with existing coherence-based theories of discourse (eg., Hobbs [29], Kehler 
[37], Asher et al. [8]) we assume that any utterance containing an anaphoric expression or 
presupposition must be coherently connected to the unit that contains its antecedent. Thus 
u4 (or u5 ) must coherently attach to more than just the agent’s latest action a; it must also 
attach to a prior utterance—this is why starting a dialogue with u4 or u5 sounds anoma-
lous. Constraints on which parts of an embodied dialogue context the current utterance can 
coherently connect to are not yet fully understood (though see Hunter et al. [35] for initial 
work). We therefore take a very permissive approach: in principle, u4 (or u5 ) can coherently 
attach to any prior dialogue move. However, in line with all coherence-based theories of 
discourse interpretation, we adopt a preference for attachment to the most recent utterance 
u that supports a coherent interpretation, and in particular supplies the required anteced-
ent. In other words, an utterance of the form u4 or u5 attaches with correction to the latest 
agent’s action a, but also to the most recent prior utterance u where a coherence relation 
R(u, u4) (or R(u, u5) ) can be established and an antecedent in u to the anaphoric expressions 
ins u4 (or u5 ) identified.
The utterance u4 can be interpreted as an elaboration of any prior correction u: even if 
u were simply the expression “no”: thanks to (5) a violated rule r can be accommodated 
as part of the content of u precisely because it corrects an agent’s (prior) action. Thus in 
embodied dialogue (2), (2f) attaches to the action (2e) with correction and also to (2d) with 
elaboration because (2d) is more recent than (2)b): 
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 The connection elaboration(d, f ) entails that in whatever way (2d) is disambiguated—
i.e, rr,b
1
 , or rr,b
2
—“the same reason” in (2f) refers to this rule. So actions (2c) and (2e) both 
violate the same rule, and so impose joint constraints on the colours of the four blocks o3 , 
o4 , o5 and o6 . This differs from the interpretation of a similar dialogue where the agent says 
(3d) below: 
 Utterance (3d) doesn’t feature a presupposition requiring an antecedent, and so coher-
ence does not demand that it be related to (3b). Thus the ambiguities in (3b) and (3d) may 
resolve in different ways—whether they do or not depends on the agent’s current beliefs 
about the colours of the blocks o3 − o6.
The utterance u5 = “that is not red either” requires an antecedent individual that’s not 
red. With this in mind, consider dialogue (4): 
Fig. 4  A state in which “No, put 
red blocks on blue blocks and 
you can only have one red block 
in any tower” is ambiguous, even 
if the agent knows the colours of 
the blocks (Color figure online)
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 The utterance (4h) corrects action (4g), and coherence demands that it also attach to a 
prior utterance that entails that something isn’t red. It cannot attach to (4e) with elabora-
tion or with any other relation: in particular, it cannot elaborate either of the rules that 
(4e) might express while at the same time violating a rule that’s expressed in terms of red, 
which it must do given that (4h) corrects an action (namely, (4g)). On the other hand, if 
the agent’s beliefs about the colours of o3 and o4 are consistent with resolving the ambigu-
ity in (4d) to rr,b
2
 , then by (7) this interpretation provides an antecedent that’s not red—
namely o3—and moreover it supports an elaboration relation between (4d) and (4h). Thus 
discourse coherence results in (4h) attaching to (4d) with elaboration, the ambiguity in 
(4d) is resolved to rr,b
2
 , and hence (via Eq. (7)) o3 and o7 are not red and o4 and o8 are blue.
Both these examples illustrate how anaphora can impose additional constraints on inter-
preting both linguistic and non-linguistic moves. Our model (Sect.  5) and experiments 
(experiment 3 in Sect. 6) show that exploiting anaphora can help the agent to learn faster.
4.4  Silence is assent
The teacher’s dialogue strategy, the knowledge of which both the teacher and learner 
share, assumes that silence is assent. In other words, when the teacher doesn’t correct 
the agent’s latest action a, then a is a part of a valid plan for achieving G without the 
need to undo its effects. This assumption allows the agent to use the above equations 
to infer the colour of unknown blocks and also which rules are not in the goal. Sup-
pose, for instance, that the learner is now aware of the colour terms blue and red. So 
it knows that rr,b
1
 is a candidate rule in G. If its latest action a doesn’t get corrected 
by the teacher, then either this rule is not in the goal G, or the rule is in G but was 
not violated by a (i.e., a red block was put on a blue one, or a non-red block was put 
on something). We’ll present a model that exploits this in Sect. 5 and demonstrate its 
effectiveness in learning the task in Sect. 6 (see experiment 2).
5  System description
To solve the task described in Sect. 3, the agent we build switches between two sets 
of behaviour: Action Selection, where the agent uses its accumulated knowledge to 
construct a plan for completing the task at hand; and Correction Handling, where the 
agent updates its beliefs about the planning problem, to improve its ability to plan. 
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Algorithm 1 describes how these two systems are called upon during the solving of a 
single planning problem instance, while Fig. 5 describes the main components of the 
agent’s systems and how they interact with the teacher and the world.
5.1  Action selection
To generate a valid plan, the agent uses the MetricFF symbolic planner [31, 32]). As input, 
the planner requires a representation of the current world state, the goal, and a set of action 
descriptions. The agent’s initial representation of the planning problem is shown in Figs. 6 
and 7. As we described earlier, these representations are deficient in that parts of the goal are 
missing, the predicate symbols in which the missing parts of the goal are expressed (namely, 
predicate symbols corresponding to colour), are not a part of the agent’s conceptualisation 
of the domain, and the agent therefore doesn’t know how to evaluate the truth value of lit-
erals involving those symbols. The action descriptions put(x,y) and unstack(x,y) 
are known. The remaining aspects of the planning problem (that is, the state and the goal as 
defined in Fig. 7) get revised as learning proceeds: predicate symbols like red and blue get 
added to the vocabulary of fluents (see Fig. 8), and accordingly literals such as (red b3) 
and (blue b4) get added to (or removed from) the state. Further, statements such as the 
one given in (11) (the PDDL equivalent of rr,b
2
 ) get added to (or removed from) the goal (see 
also Fig. 9).
The question then is: exactly when and how do such literals and formulae become a part of 
the agent’s representation of the planning problem, which the MetricFF must then solve? 
The remainder of this section describes how the Action Selection system copes with uncer-
tainty about its (symbolic) representation of the current state and the goal G in its search 
for a valid plan.
5.1.1  Grounding models
The agent constructs a representation of the current state using its (current) grounding 
model to predict which blocks can be described by which colours. Grounding amounts to 
estimating how likely it is that a particular colour term can be used to describe a particular 
object, given its observable visual features, e.g. P(Red(x)|F(x)) where Red(x) is a binary 
variable indicating whether x is red, or not. We use binary variables over a categorical 
colour distribution because more than one concept might apply to the object, such as red 
and maroon , and because the agent doesn’t know the set of possible colours. Binary clas-
sifiers allow the seamless addition of new concepts as and when they are discovered. This 
probability can be estimated using Bayes Rule:
where
(11)횏횘횛횊횕횕(?횢)(횘횛(횗횘횝(횋횕횞횎?횢))(횎횡횒횜횝횜(?횡)(횊횗획(횛횎획?횡)(횘횗?횡?횢)))
(12)P(Red(x)|F(x)) = 1
휂
P(F(x)|Red(x))P(Red(x))
(13)휂 =
∑
i∈{0,1}
P(F(x)|Red(x) = i)P(Red(x) = i)
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We set the prior P(Red(x)) = 0.5 Note that this is a binary classification between Red(x) 
and ¬Red(x) rather than a selection of a colour among several options. A more reasonable 
value for the prior would be 1∕(#colours) ; however, the number of colours is unknown 
prior to execution and so it’s not possible to use this. Instead, we use 0.5 to allow the 
importance of the P(F(x)|Red(x)) term to take precedence over the prior.
We define the likelihood P(F(x)|red(x) = 1) vs. P(F(x)|red(x) = 0) differently. We 
represent P(F(x)|red(x) = 0) as a uniform distribution: since there isn’t a consistent sig-
nature for colours that aren’t red, we expect them to be distributed fairly uniformly over 
Fig. 5  The agent consists of an 
action selection system (yellow) 
and a learning system (green). 
Action selection uses a symbolic 
planner to find a plan given the 
most likely goal and grounding 
of colour terms. The learning 
system uses coherence to build a 
probability model, used to learn 
what rules are in the goal and 
how to ground colour terms
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Fig. 6  The basic domain definition includes the actions put and unstack
Fig. 7  The problem definition that the agent can access prior to interaction with the teacher and learning. It 
includes an initial state with the position of all objects and a goal definition which requires every block to 
be in a tower. This shows an example shows a problem with 3 blocks and 2 towers, but our problems use 10 
blocks and 1–3 towers
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the RGB spectrum. We do not update this distribution during training.5 P(F(x)|Red(x) = 1) 
is estimated with weighted Kernel Density Estimation (wKDE). KDE is a non-paramet-
ric model which places a kernel around every known data point and calculates the prob-
ability of a new data point by summing over the values of the kernels at that point. For 
wKDE this sum is weighted by weights w and normalised by their sum. For m data points 
{(w1,F(x1)),…(wm,F(xm))} and kernel 휑 this becomes:
We use a diagonal Gaussian kernel. The pairs (w, F(x)) are generated by the Correction 
Handling system (see Sect. 5.2).
5.1.2  The goal
The agent requires a formal representation of the goal G to perform planning. The agent 
begins with the (correct) knowledge that it must place all blocks in a specified number of 
towers:
(14)P(F(x)�Red(x) = 1) =
1
m∑
i=1
wi
m�
i=1
wi ⋅ 휑(F(x) − F(xi))
Algorithm 1:  The general pro-
cedure for completing a plan in 
each planning problem instance. 
The function FINDPLAN is 
described in Sect. 5.1, HANDLE 
CORRECTION in Sect. 5.2, and 
HANDLEASSENT in Sect. 4.4. 
ELICITFEEDBACK simply 
gives the teacher and opportunity 
to give feedback, either returning 
a correction or declining to give 
feedback
Algorithm 2:  To update the grounding models the agent takes model P and current evidence X, for every 
colour concept node (i.e. node which represents a particular object being a particular colour, such as 
Red(o4)) in the model, infer the probability of that node given the available evidence. If it is above a thresh-
old 휏 which we set to 0.7 then we update the parameters of the colour model for the colour c given the fea-
tures of o weighted by its probability w. In our implementation UPDATEPARAMTERS adds the datapoint 
to the wKDE and the grounding probability is calculated using Equation (14)
5 We could easily update it if it made sense to do so, since the corrections will generate negative exemplars 
of concepts (see the negated literals in Eqs. 6–9). In fact, this could be a strength of using corrective dia-
logue moves, compared with descriptions that generally do not generate such exemplars except when the 
linguistic form of the utterance features negation [48].
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However, it must use the teacher’s feedback 퐗 to find the most likely set of additional rules 
which are also conjuncts in G:
The set R = {r1… rn} is the set of possible rules that the agent is currently aware of, as 
determined by the colour terms it’s aware of (so R gets larger during learning). For each 
r ∈ R , the agent keeps track of a probabilistic belief that r ∈ G , and assumes their mutual 
independence:
Further, the agent assumes for each r ∈ R that the prior r ∈ G is unlikely—that is, 
P(r ∈ G) = 0.1 . Due to the independence assumption (17), this means the goal G is con-
structed by adding as a conjunct any rule r ∈ R such that P(r ∈ G|퐗) > 0.5 . All other 
rules in R are omitted from G.
5.1.3  Finding a plan
The agent constructs a noisy estimate of the current state S∗ and goal G given the evi-
dence 퐗 so far. That noise might make it impossible for the planner to find a valid plan: for 
instance, it could be that according to the agent’s estimates, rr,b
1
∈ G and there are more red 
blocks than blue blocks in S∗ . In such cases, the agent recovers by searching in the proba-
bilistic neighbourhood of S∗ for alternatives from which a valid plan for achieving G can be 
constructed, as defined in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 uses the most likely goal G throughout. It constructs a priority queue 퐒 of 
states initialised with the most likely state S∗ at the top. The search proceeds by selecting 
the top state, S′ from 퐒 and attempting to find a plan, returning it if successful. Other-
wise the algorithm generates additional candidate search states. This is done by flipping 
the truth value of colour judgements, such as Red(o1) = 1 to Red(o1) = 0 . The selection 
of values to flip are made to maximise the probability of the state and to move towards 
states which are more likely to allow for a valid plan, for example, if rr,b
1
∈ G∗ then values 
are selected to increase the number of blue blocks or decrease the number of red blocks. 
The algorithm continues until a plan is found, or a maximum number of ‘flipping’ steps N 
have been taken, in which case the agent constructs a plan that satisfies the default goal of 
(15)∀x.(block(x)→ ∃y(tower(y) ∧ in(x, y))) ∧ count(tower) = n
(16)G = arg maxr1,…,rn
P(r1 ∈ G,… , rn ∈ G|퐗)
(17)P(r ∈ G, r� ∈ G|퐗) = P(r ∈ G|퐗)P(r� ∈ G|퐗)
Algorithm 3:  To update the goal the agent takes the current model P and the available evidence X and pre-
dicts how likely each known rule is to be in the goal given the evidence. If the probability is higher than 0.5 
then the rule is added to the goal, if it is lower it is not added and is removed if it was in the goal already
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having all blocks in towers, arranged in any way regardless of their colour. This ensures 
some plan is always found.
Once a plan is found the agent executes its actions in sequence until either the problem 
instance is completed, or the teacher gives corrective feedback. If a correction occurs then 
the Correction Handling system takes over.
5.2  Handling corrections
As shown in Sect.  5.1, the two main outcomes expected from correction handling are 
updating the grounding models and the goal G. We do this by making use of the constraints 
imposed by equations 5–9 in Sect. 4.
5.2.1  Adding to the domain model
When the teacher provides feedback, her utterance u is parsed using the English 
Resource Grammar [14] to extract relevant content words. The surface form of the 
utterance together with the extracted content words are used to construct rules in the 
shape of r1 , r2 , and r3 (the mapping between input utterance and rules is hand crafted, 
and shown in Table  1). The teacher’s pointing action (a symbolic specification of the 
block being pointed at, either a block in the tower directly violating a rule or a block on 
the table) tells the agent whether a direct or indirect violation has occurred. When the 
teacher’s feedback features an anaphoric expression (see Sect. 4.3), this stage also looks 
back in the dialogue to find which previous utterance it should connect to. The output of 
this step reveals which possible messages M(u) the speaker could have intended, given 
the syntactic form of her utterance—the three possible choices are (1) r1 or r2 (e.g., “no, 
put red blocks on blue blocks”); or (2) r3 (e.g., “no, you can have at most one red block 
in any tower”); or (3) r3 combined with either r1 or r2 (e.g., “no, you can have at most 
Algorithm 4:  Algorithm for finding a plan that is most likely to be valid, given thecolours the agent is cur-
rently aware of and its beliefs about symbol grounding (ie, beliefs about which blocks are which colours) 
and its beliefs about the goal. For the planner we use MetricFF. N represents the number of states that the 
learner searches through before resorting to the default plan, of simply putting all blocks in the specified 
number of towers, regardless of their colour. N is a hyper parameter, which we have set to 20 for our experi-
ments. S∗ is the state made up of the most likely decision about the colour of each block for all known col-
ours and objects
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one block in any tower and put red blocks on blue blocks”), where in each case the rel-
evant colour and number terms that feature in the speaker’s utterance (correctly) anno-
tate those possibilities. It also reveals whether the violation is direct or indirect (via the 
pointing), and whether the utterance featured an anaphoric expression.
At this stage, the agent will check if it has encountered before the colour words 
which are referenced in the correction or not. If a word “C” has not been encountered 
before, then the agent adds C to its NL vocabulary, the binary random variable C(x) to 
its domain model, and generates a new grounding model, for estimating P(C(x)|F(x)) 
for the previously unforeseen concept C. It also extends its set of possible rules R to 
include those rules that feature C. Figures 8 and 9 shows how the domain and problem 
files are updated when the agent encounters the concepts red and blue and infers rr,b
2
 is 
in the goal.
5.2.2  Inferring the most likely state
The agent updates its grounding model by inferring which of the states in Figs. 2, 3 and 
4 is most likely, and therefore, which blocks have which colour. Making this inference 
also allows the agent to infer which rules are in the goal. In this section we consider 
how the agent makes these inferences after an example correction u1 = “no, put red 
blocks on blue blocks” of the action a1 = put(o1, o2) . When appropriate we will differen-
tiate between a direct violation (indicated by the teacher pointing at the tower) as uD
1
 and 
an indirect violation (indicated by the teacher pointing at another block o3 ) as uI1 . The 
evidence which the agent observes for a correction is twofold. First, the agent knows 
a correction occurred: i.e. Corr(a1, u1) = True . Secondly, the agent can observe F(o1) , 
F(o2) , and F(o3).
Given the available evidence the agent attempts to make two types of inference given 
the available evidence: (1) which of the rules is most likely to be in the goal:
Fig. 8  Updating the domain by 
adding the new colour concepts 
the agent has become aware of
Fig. 9  What the agent adds to the problem initial state if the agent is told “no, red blocks should be on 
blue blocks and it infers that rr,b
2
 is in the goal. Adding (blueb0) and (redb1) to the initial state assumes the 
agent’s grounding models have deemed these objects to have a probability of being each of those colours 
bigger than 0.5 and all other objects not to satisfy this probability threshold (Color figure online)
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and (2) which block can be described with a relevant colour
For any particular correction the probability of a rule being in the goal will only change 
for those rules in the set M(u), due to our independence assumption. Further, the agent can 
only make inferences about the colour of blocks which have been involved in the correc-
tion, i.e. Red(o1) , Blue(o2) , and, if it is an indirect violation, Red(o3) and Blue(o3).
To compute these inferences, the agent builds a probabilistic model which captures 
the semantics of Eqs. 5–9. The model generated for a direct violation is pictured graphi-
cally in Fig.  10: grey nodes represent observed evidence while white nodes represent 
latent variables. The arrows represent probabilistic dependencies. Starting at the top, the 
factor (21) is defines so as to capture Eq. (5):
It is a deterministic factor, which provides a probability of 1 to any state which satisfies 
Eq.  (5): so when Corr(a1, u1) = True one of the two rules—rr,b1  or r
r,b
2
—must be violated 
and part of the goal G. Any other state is given 0 probability. Thus an interpretation of the 
evidence where neither rule is violated or neither rule is in G is ruled out.
Next are the violation factors VD(rr,b1 , a1) and VD(r
r,b
2
, a1) . The relevant factor (22) is 
determined deterministically via Eq. (6) for i = 1 and (7) for i = 2:
(18)P(ri ∈ G|Corr(a1, u1),F(o1),F(o2),F(o3))
(19)P(Red(o1)|Corr(a1, u1),F(o1),F(o2),F(o3))
(20)P(Blue(o2)|Corr(a1, u1),F(o1),F(o2),F(o3))
(21)P(Corr(a1, u1)|rr,b1 ∈ G,VD(rr,b1 , a1),VD(rr,b2 , a1), rr,b2 ∈ G)
(22)P(VD(rr,bi , a1)|Red(o1),Blue(o2))
Fig. 10  The nodes added to the 
probabilistic graphical model 
after a correction uD
1
= “no, put 
red blocks on blue blocks”. Grey 
nodes are observed and white 
ones are latent (Color figure 
online)
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In other words, P(VD(rr,b1 , a1) = True|red(o1),¬blue(o2)) = 1 , and for any other values of 
Red(o1) and Blue(o2) the probability is 0. For VD(rr,b1 , a1) = False the exact opposite is the 
case. For VD(rr,b2 , a1) the same holds but for Eq. (7) instead.
The remaining nodes P(Red(o1)|F(o1)) and P(Blue(o2)|F(o2)) are defined by the agent’s 
current grounding model. P(F(oi)) is a prior which is assumed to be a constant for all oi . 
Finally, P(rr,b
i
∈ G) is the agent’s prior belief that rr,b
i
 is in the goal ( i = 1, 2 ). As we men-
tioned earlier, this is set to 0.1 initially; however, the prior will have been updated by what 
was learned from earlier problem instances where the agent was trying to learn this plan-
ning problem. The details of this are specified in Sect. 5.2.7.
When the teacher’s pointing indicates an indirect violation, resulting in utterance uI
1
 , 
the agent’s aim is the same: to infer the most likely rule that the teacher is expressing (i.e., 
r
r,b
1
 or rr,b
2
 ) as a part of the goal G, and to update its inferences about the colour of relevant 
objects in the current state. Equations 8 and 9 constrain the colour of the top two blocks in 
the tower and relative number of those remaining on the table. We could generate a prob-
abilistic model which estimates the probability of each block being red and blue, which 
could provide several new data points for the grounding models. However, doing so carries 
a considerable computational cost. In the worst case, for a problem instance with 10 blocks 
in it, there might be 8 blocks left on the table. The model would then require 16 binary 
variables to represent each block possibly being either red or blue. This would mean 216 
possible interpretations of the world which would be infeasible to deal with. As such we 
have chosen to simplify the inference problem while still supporting efficient learning. The 
simplification is that, out of the blocks on the table, we will only consider the colour of the 
block which the teacher pointed at, in our example o3 . We do this by taking into account 
the fact that the object the teacher is pointing at will be red for VI(rr,b1 , a1) and blue for 
VI(r
r,b
2
, a1) . This yields new equations for interpreting Indirect violations:
Having established these equations, building a model capturing a semantics is straight 
forward, as shown in Fig.  11. Just as with the direct violation model, P(corr(a1, u1)) is 
(23)VI(rr,b1 , a1) ↔ (¬red(o1) ∧ blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2) ∧ red(o3))
(24)VI(rr,b2 , a1) ↔ (red(o1) ∧ ¬blue(o2) ∧ on(o1, o2) ∧ blue(o3))
Fig. 11  The nodes added to the 
graphical model after an indirect 
violation uI
1
 = “no, put red blocks 
on blue blocks” with the teacher 
pointing at o3 . Grey nodes are 
observed and white nodes are 
latent (Color figure online)
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assigned a probability of 1 only for cases where rr,b
1
∈ G and VI(rr,b1 , a1) is true, or r2 ∈ G 
and VI(rr,b2 , a1) is true. The violation variables then gives a probability of 1 to any interpre-
tation that fits with Eqs. 23 and 24 respectively; 0 otherwise. The remaining parameters of 
Fig. 11 are the same as described above.
5.2.3  Repeated corrections and anaphora
The agent may be wrong more than once in the course of solving its planning problem, 
leading to several occasions where the teacher utters a correction. In Appelgren and Las-
carides [5] we treated each such correction as a separate event, disconnected from prior 
corrections except through the probabilistic updates to the grounding model and to the goal 
G. This meant that the agent would not revise any previous inferences about the teacher’s 
intended message, given subsequent evidence. In our new model, we fix this by cultivating 
a growing probabilistic model. Each time a new correction is given, additional nodes are 
added to the existing model, reflecting the new evidence and new latent information. For 
example, if after a1 and u1 , the top object o1 is removed and the agent performs the action 
a2 = put(o4, o2) and the teacher utters the same correction, i.e. u2 = “no, put red blocks on 
blue blocks”, then nodes for F(o4) and Red(o4) will be added, together with violation vari-
ables and a correction variable, resulting in Fig. 12. However, importantly, Blue(o2) and 
F(o2) as well as rr,b1 ∈ G and r
r,b
2
∈ G will connect to the newly added correction variables. 
Inference is done on the entire model, which may grow large depending on the number 
of mistakes the agent makes. However, given the incremental nature of the feedback it is 
possible to keep the inference reasonably small by keeping track of which possible latent 
variable states had non-zero probability previously. This set will be relatively small: for 
example, for the correction uD
1
 there are only 4 non-zero probability latent states, compared 
to 26 = 64 possible latent states. Combined with the fact that no previously discounted (0 
probability) state can ever be made non-zero, it means that when a second correction is 
Fig. 12  The state of the graphical model after two corrections: first a1 = put(o1, o2) corrected with uD1∶1 = 
“no, put red blocks on blue blocks” followed by a2 = put(o4, o2) being corrected by uD1∶2 = “no, put red 
blocks on blue blocks” (Color figure online)
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added, only these 4 latent states need to be considered, together with any states added by 
the new correction.
In this work we also introduce the possibility for the teacher to use additional correc-
tions which contain anaphoric expressions, instead of repeating the same correction con-
tent several times. These elaborations of prior corrections, introduced in Sect.  4.3, will 
also be used to update our probability model. As established in that section, an elaboration 
implies that the content of the previous correction also applies to the current action. This 
means the first step to dealing with the elaborations is adding to the model exactly the 
nodes which would have been added if the teacher had instead repeated the correction. 
However, the additional information which the agent can exploit during learning is that the 
violated rule is the same in both situations. By default, the model allows an interpretation 
of two corrections that are not coherently related to violate distinct rules, even if the utter-
ances are the same—“no, put red blocks on blue blocks”, say. It must do this, because both 
r
r,b
1
 and rr,b
2
 may be in G and the teacher uses the same (ambiguous) utterance to describe 
both rules. So, to ensure that the agent’s inferences are consistent with the fact that two 
corrections are connected with the coherence relation elaboration (or Elab for short), we 
add a Boolean random variable Elab(u1, u2) , where (25) has a non-zero probability only if 
both V(rr,b
1
, a1) = True and V(rr,b1 , a2) = True , or V(r
r,b
2
, a1) = True and V(rr,b2 , a2) = True.
The resulting probability model is shown in Fig. 13.
For “no, that is not red either” the same elaboration variable is added to the graphical 
model. Additionally, the agent will know that an object was “not red”. It can infer which 
object it is by reasoning that the redness of that object must have bearing on the inference. 
In other words, o2 not being red is not relevant to the correction u1 , while knowing that o1 
or o4 is is highly valuable. From this fact the agent can infer that these are the objects that 
must have been “not red” and it therefore adds red(o1) = 0 and red(o4) = 0 to its observed 
evidence, which allows the agent to infer the correct latent states for two different actions.
(25)P(Elab(u1, u2)|V(rr,b1 , a1),V(rr,b2 , a1),V(rr,b1 , a2),V(rr,b2 , a2))
Fig. 13  The graph after two corrections where the second is an elaboration
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5.2.4  Inferences when no correction occurs
As described in Sect. 4.4, the shared dialogue strategy between teacher and agent means 
that the teacher’s silence implies assent—the agent’s latest action a is part of a valid plan 
for achieving G. We can take advantage of this fact, by using Eqs. 6 and 7: we know that 
neither of these rules has been violated. Therefore, when no correction is given the agent 
could add the same nodes as it would for when a correction happens, i.e. those in Fig. 10. 
Then, instead of the observed evidence Corr(u1, a1) = True , the observed evidence is 
Corr(u, a1) = False (where u = silence). The agent can then perform updates to its model 
of symbol grounding, as before.
Doing this for every uncorrected move and the entire set of known rules would become 
very computationally expensive as the model would grow very large. Further, the benefit 
will be minor in cases where no correction is expected, i.e., when blocks of colours not rel-
evant to known rules are placed on each other. Therefore, the biggest benefit will be gained 
when a block with a colour relevant to a rule is involved in the action. For example, if a red 
block is placed, the agents estimates for rules such as rr,x
1
 , r2r, x and rr,n3  could be changed. 
If, on the other hand, a non-red block is placed, the agents belief about these rules would 
not be impacted. As such, we keep track of which blocks the agent has a strong belief about 
their colour and only perform an update when these blocks are part of an action, mak-
ing inferences using the relevant violation factors for impacted rules. We use a threshold 
P(Colour(o1)|F(o1)) > 0.7 to trigger this behaviour.
5.2.5  Colour count rules
Dealing with rules of type r3 requires a way to update the model in the two situations 
described in Sect.  4.2. In the case where, for example, rr,1
3
∈ G and the agent places a 
Algorithm 5  The algorithm for handling a corrections. The input to the function are the teacher’s utterance 
μ, the most recent action a, and the arguments to this action x and y, if the teacher pointed at a block on 
the table the id of that block is provided as z. Also included in the function are two persistent structures: Pt 
representing the probability model and Xt representing the known observable evidence at time t. The agent 
extracts the possible messages M(μ) from the teacher′s utterance μ. It keeps track of the colours it knows 
about in C and the rules it knows about in R which can easily be extracted from the messages. It uses the 
message and the arguments of the action to update the probability model. Xt contains the observed data. 
The agent checks if it can infer which rule was violated with probability higher than 휏 which we set as 0.7. 
If not the agent asks for help, and the answer is added to the available evidence. Lastly the agent updates its 
grounding models and goal description and undoes the offending action
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second red block on a tower, the teacher’s correction will result in the agent constructing 
the graphical model in Fig.  16. It has a similar structure to the previous models, except 
that it includes a node for every block in the relevant tower: this enables the model to cap-
ture inferences that at least one block in the tower already in the tower must be red (see 
Eq. (10)). The factor P(Corr(a, u)|r3,V(r3, a)) is defined in a similar way to previous mod-
els, except in this case, thanks to the lack of linguistic ambiguity, there is only one possible 
rule. As such the probability is 1 only when the random variables rr,1
3
∈ G and V(rr,1
3
, a) are 
both true; and 0 otherwise.
For the violation factor P(V(r3, a)|퐗) where 퐗 is the relevant evidence, this factor gives 
probability of 1 to any interpretation where there are exactly n + 1 blocks of the offending 
colour in the tower, where n is the number in the rule, with the block that a just added to 
the tower being one of those (see Eq. (10)). The remaining factors are the same as in previ-
ous sections. The PDDL specification of the planning problem, which the MetricFF plan-
ner must then solve, are shown in Figs. 14 and 15: they respectively add the new colour 
predicate symbol and count functions to the domain model, and the PDDL representation 
of the r3 rule to the goal.
Fig. 14  When the agent learns that rblue,3
3
 constrains the problem, the agent adds the colour concept blue 
to the domain, it additionally adds (blue-count ?tower) as a function. This will be used to count 
the number of blue blocks in a tower. We also update the actions to keep track of these counts (Color figure 
online)
Fig. 15  When the agent learns that rblue,1
3
 constrains the problem the agent adds (= (blue-count tx) 
0) for every tower in the problem as well as adding the actual r3 rule to the goal description
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For the second violation type, we have a conjunction of two rules being violated, but 
neither violated on its own. Thus the graphical model that the agent generates when the 
teacher utters u3 (e.g., “no, red blocks should be on blue blocks and you can have only 
one red block in any tower”) is like Fig. 16, but with added variables V(rr,b
1
∧ rr,1
3
, a) and 
V(rr,b
2
∧ rr,1
3
, a) ; see Fig. 17. As described in Sect. 4.2, it would be possible in principle to 
estimate the counts of red and blue blocks on the table to inform estimates as to which of 
these two rules is violated, but it is computationally costly and of limited benefit. So the 
Fig. 16  The graphical 
model after a correction of 
a1 = put(o1, o2) of the form u1 = 
“no, no more than one red block 
in the tower”. The tower at the 
time of correction consists of 
blocks o1 , o2 , and o3 (Color figure 
online)
Fig. 17  The graphical model after a correction u1 = “no, no more than one red block in the tower and put 
red blocks on blue blocks”. At the time of the correction the tower consists of o1 , o2 , and o3  (Color figure 
online)
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factors in the model are the same regardless of whether the rule is of type rr,b
1
 or rr,b
2
 : it 
gives probability 1 to an interpretation where the number of red blocks in the tower is equal 
to n and the top block is blue. Other corrections will have to be used to infer which of the 
two alternative rules is actually part of the goal (or both).
Figures 14 and 15 show how the domain is updated when the agent learns that rblue,1
3
 
is in the goal. Since the planner will have to keep track of the number of blue blocks in a 
tower we need to add a function which keeps track of the this number and update the action 
description to update this number.
5.2.6  Using inference to update beliefs
The above graphical models, which are generated by the agent as it observes the teacher’s 
responses to its moves, are used to update the agent’s beliefs about symbol grounding and 
the goal G. The inference from Eq. (18) will update the agents belief about which rules are 
in the goal; see Sect. 5.1.2.
To update the grounding models the agent performs the inference in (26) (and similar 
updates for other colours):
It will then add to the wKDE models available data the new weight, data point pair 
(w,F(o1)) . In this way the model learns to better recognise objects that are “red” as it exe-
cutes its plans and acquires further feedback from the teacher. However, to minimise the 
noise within the agent’s training data, we set a threshold of for including data points: the 
agent updates its grounding model with its estimates of the colours of blocks in the current 
state only if w > 0.7.
In some cases the agent will not have enough previous knowledge to make a mean-
ingful inference. For example, if the agent has not encountered the terms “red” or “blue” 
before there will be an equal probability placed on either of the two possible interpreta-
tions. In this case the agent will ask for help from the teacher as described in Sect. 4.1. The 
answer to the question will be added to the agent’s observed evidence, which then triggers 
updates to the inferences. Due to the nature of the constraints on coherent discourse that 
we described in Sect. 4, this will lead to the agent being certain about which situation it is 
in, thereby providing a starting point for the agent’s further learning of the rules and the 
grounding of colours.
5.2.7  New planning problem instance
Our experiments in Sect. 6 are set up so that for each goal G, the agent faces 50 planning 
problem instances, each constrained by the same rules, in which the agent gathers evidence 
for learning G and symbol grounding. Each problem instance consists of a initial world 
state—i.e., a fixed set of blocks on the table, the the colours of those blocks varies from 
one problem to another (see Sect. 6 for details). The agent attempts to complete a valid plan 
in each of the 50 problem instances in turn. The agent updates its beliefs about G and sym-
bol grounding from its observations of the teacher’s reaction to each action it executes, as 
described in this Section. Thus within any given problem, the agent’s revised beliefs about 
G and about the world state may trigger, via the Action Selection module (Sect. 5.1), revi-
sions to the plan it executes. When the agent encounters a new problem, the agent retains 
(26)w ∶= P(Red(o1)|퐗)
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its current beliefs, as learned from the previous ones, about symbol grounding and about 
G. These current beliefs are treated as priors when starting a new problem instance. How-
ever, the agent does not retain the prior problem’s graphical model, which the agent gener-
ated dynamically, as the teacher-agent interaction unfolded; rather, it starts with a ‘clean 
slate’ (while retaining its beliefs about what the set of random variables are). To put this 
another way, we assume that the start of each problem instance marks the start of a new 
coherent conversation. Therefore, anaphoric expressions cannot refer back to antecedents 
introduced in any prior instance. This not only respects constraints on discourse coherence, 
but also serves to ensure the graphical model does not grow impossibly large for practical 
learning and inference.
6  Experiments
We present four sets of experiments, which test the methods described in this paper. The 
first experiment shows the value of the rich linguistic evidence we described in Sects. 3 
and  4. We show that our models of language interpretation and grounding allow much 
faster learning for solving the planning problem than attempting to learn only from the 
fact that the teacher corrected the agent—in effect, learning from only the cue phrase “no”. 
The second experiment shows that exploiting the teacher’s silence as evidence of assent 
greatly improves the agent’s speed of learning. The third experiment tests the hypoth-
esis that exploiting anaphoric expressions of the kind we described in Sect. 4.3 when the 
agent repeats mistakes leads to faster learning, because coherence constraints on anaphora 
reduce ambiguity overall. In the final experiments we use r3 rules to investigate the trade-
off between the computational cost of exploiting monotonic entailments from the teacher’s 
linguistic move versus the benefit to task learning that the entailment provides.
To test each of our agents, we conduct an experiment that consists of 50 planning prob-
lems or trials: i.e., 50 goals G. Each goal G is constructed so that there are no contradic-
tory rules, given ground truth about the denotations of colours (e.g., rred,blue
1
 and rred,green
1
 
can’t both be conjuncts in G). Other than this, each of the 50 goals is randomly generated 
to contain a certain number of rules of certain types—we motivate the number and type 
of rules in our experiments according to which hypotheses we’re testing, as detailed in 
Experiments 1 to 4 below.
For each goal G, the agent learns G and symbol grounding via 50 planning problem 
instances, which the agent tackles in sequence (see Sect. 5.2.7). For each instance, we gen-
erate an initial state via random sampling of 10 coloured blocks, so that (a) there is a valid 
plan for achieving G from that initial state; and (b) the probability distributions for choos-
ing the colours of the 10 blocks makes it highly likely that there are several blocks with 
colours that are relevant to the goal G (e.g., if rred,blue
1
 is a part of G, then we make it highly 
likely that the initial state features red and blue blocks). At the start of each trial, a new 
agent is initialized—i.e., it not only has no knowledge of the goal G that it must learn, but 
it is also made unaware of all colour terms and their denotations. It proceeds to learn via its 
actions and teacher feedback, as described in Sect. 5.
We measure the performance of each agent by measuring its regret, which we define 
as the number of mistakes an agent makes, which is equivalent to the number of times the 
teacher must correct it—so low numbers are better than high ones! In the graphs below, the 
y axis is the average regret over the 50 goals (or trials) G that the agent faced in the experi-
ment, and the x axis is the number of planning problem instances it has been exposed to so 
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far within a given trial. Significance among the different performances of two distinct agent 
types is tested using a paired t-test on their final total regrets over all the trials in the exper-
iment. To try visualise this pairwise difference in terminal regret (i.e. regret after the 50 
trials) we present box plots Stryjewski [58] of the difference between two agents. The box 
shows the median (centre line), 25th and 75th quartile (edges of the box) and the min and 
max value (lines on the “whiskers” coming out of the box). Individual points outside of 
these extremes are outliers, which are points 1.5 times away from the inter-quartile range. 
The difference is calculated such that positive values represent that the agent named second 
in the legend has higher terminal regret, i.e. performed worse. In other words, positive val-
ues are good for the agent named first and negative values are good for the second agent.
Each experiment has been run afresh for this paper with new goals and initial states; 
however, some experiments do overlap with previously published results. Experiment 1 
mirrors the experiments presented in [5], but with an updated version of the Language 
agent.6 Further, this experiment now also features goals G that draw from the additional 
form of rules considered in this paper, namely r3 . Experiments 2 and 3 mirror those pre-
sented in Appelgren and Lascarides [4]. Experiment 4 is completely new. Further, the man-
ner in which colours of the blocks in the problem instances are generated has changed from 
previous papers. Previously, colours were selected from a fixed set of specific RGB values, 
whereas in this paper colours are generated from a continuous range.
6.1  Experiment 1
Previous work where agents learn via an interaction with a teacher made use of corrective 
feedback with little linguistic content [39, 51]. The purpose of our first experiment is to 
show that making use of linguistically more complex corrections provides valuable evi-
dence, even when that complexity exhibits neologisms and semantic scope ambiguities that 
must be resolved via context in order to solve the planning problem. We show that such 
evidence can nevertheless enable the agent to learn faster and more effectively than a sim-
pler teacher utterance, such as “no”. So to test our hypothesis, we compare our Language 
agent, which uses the models from Sect. 5, to two baselines: the Naive Agent and the No 
Language Agent. The Naive Agent acts as a lower-bound on performance by not learning at 
all between problem instances. It simply avoids repeating any action which was previously 
corrected within the current problem. In other words. if put(o1, o2) is corrected, it will not 
repeat that action in the same problem instance.
The No Language Agent learns from the fact that the teacher corrected the agent, 
but ignores its linguistic content. It observes that the teacher said “no” and whether the 
teacher pointed at the tower or at a particular block on the table. It makes all its infer-
ences from these facts alone. Its Action Selection system is as described in Sect. 5.1, but 
its Correction Handling module is different. The No Language Agent attempts to learn 
rules and ground symbols. However, it will not always be able to construct full rules 
of form r1 or r2 . For a direct violation the agent can only infer that objects with similar 
6 Appelgren and Lascarides [5] treat each correction as an independent event while Appelgren and 
Lascarides [4] and this paper consider the connection between corrections by building up the model as 
described in Sect. 5.2.3.
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RGB values to o1 must not be placed on objects similar to o2 , as shown in (27), where Coi 
is grounded by creating a new grounding model with a single data point, namely F(oi):
When the teacher points at o3 it’s an indirect violation of an r1 or r2 rule, so the agent knows 
that o3 must either be placed on objects similar to o2 or that objects similar to o1 must be 
placed on o3:
(27)¬∃x ⋅ y ⋅ Co1 (x) ∧ Co2 (y) ∧ on(x, y)
(28)r1 = ∀x ⋅ Co3 (x)→ ∃y ⋅ Co2 (y) ∧ on(x, y)
Table 3  Mean Terminal Regret for for the three agents and three planning problems of Experiment 1. A 
pairwise t-test combining all trials shows that the No Language agent significantly outperforms the Naive 
Agent ( t = 37.37 , p = 1.42e−77 ) And that the Language agent significantly outperforms the No Language 
agent ( t = 20.32 , p = 9.39e−45)
Problem Naive No language Language
r3 and r1 or r2 200.4 75.1 15.14
Two r1 or r2 rules 241.8 100.0 25.7
Three r1 or r2 rules 288 126 38
Fig. 18  Average cumulative regret on three different trials comparing our Language Agent, a No Language 
Agent, and a Naive Agent. The graphs show the mean of regret over 50 trials
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However, the agent does not know which is correct. It attempts to find out by attempting to 
break one of the rules. If r1 is in the goal then placing a block different from o3 on o2 should 
cause the teacher to correct it. Thus the agent finds the remaining block most dissimilar to 
o3 and places it on o2 . If a correction occurs then the agent adds r1 to the goal; otherwise, r2 . 
Finally, when no pointing occurs, the violated rule must be of type r3 . The agent knows Co1 
must be the constrained colour in the rule, but it does not know the number n. However, it 
estimates n by counting the blocks in the tower that are similar to o1 , thereby estimating the 
violated rule to be rCo1 ,n
3
.
We test these three agents in three sets of 50 trials: these three sets differ in the num-
ber of rules that are present in its 50 goals (2 or 3 rules) and in the types of those 
rules, as shown in the results in Fig.  18 with average terminal regret summarised in 
Table  3 and visualised in Fig.  19. The No Language Agent significantly outperforms 
the Naive Agent ( t = 37.37 , p = 1.42e−77 ), showing that there is some merit to it. How-
ever, the No Language agent is, in turn, significantly outperformed by the Language 
Agent ( t = 20.32 , p = 9.39e−45 ), showing that the evidence provided by the teacher’s 
linguistic feedback is extremely valuable, this is also supported by the fact that the Lan-
guage agent always has a lower terminal regret as shown in Fig. 19. In addition to the 
(29)r2 = ∀y ⋅ Co3 (y)→ ∃x ⋅ Co1 (x) ∧ on(x, y)
Fig. 19  This box plot shows the difference in terminal regret between the Language agent and the No Lan-
guage agent. Positive values mean the No Language agent has higher terminal regret than the Language 
agent
Table 4  Mean Terminal Regret 
for agent with Correction Only 
(CO), and Use Assent (UA) with 
or without Anaphor (A)
A pairwise t-test shows using assent significantly improves
Problem CO UA CO+A UA+A
Two r1 or r2 rules 23.6 22.3 16.3 15.4
Three r1 or r2 rules 38.3 35.5 29.0 26.7
Both r1 and r2 17.7 12.8 11.8 10.4
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Language Agent’s enhanced performance, it also learns to increase the common lan-
guage with the teacher. In a broader ITL setting, this knowledge of grounding can allow 
transfer learning to new tasks [38].
6.2  Experiment 2
Our second experiment tests the hypothesis that exploiting the fact that the teacher is silent, 
thereby implying assent, enhances data efficiency. We compare the Language Agent from 
Experiment 1, which does not update its model when there’s implied assent, to an agent 
that does, as described in Sect. 5.2.4. We compare the two agents in two different sets of 50 
trials, one where the goals consist of two r1 and/or r2 rules, and one where the goals have 
Fig. 20  Experiment comparing an agent updating only on corrections against updating on the teacher’s 
silence, which implies assent. Results are mean regret over 50 trial
Fig. 21  This box plot shows the difference in terminal regret between using assent and not (correction 
only). Positive values indicate that correction only has higher terminal regret than using assent
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three such rules. The agent’s cumulative regret is shown in Fig. 20 with the results summa-
rised in Table 4 and the difference in terminal regret visualised in Fig. 21. The paired t-test 
shows a significant improvement from exploiting the teacher’s implied assent ( t = 5.42 , 
p = 4.16e−7 ). This is supported by the fact that in about 75% of cases the agent which uses 
assent has a lower terminal regret as shown in Fig. 21.
The performance increase does come at the cost of an increase in the potential running 
time of the algorithm. We found that updating the model every time no correction was 
given and taking into account every possible rule caused some situations where the infer-
ence graph was too big and inference was infeasible (since exact inference in a Bayes Net 
is exponential). This is why we added the additional constraints as described in Sect. 5.2.4. 
With these changes, little discernible difference between inference time was found but 
there were still benefits to exploiting implied assent.
Assent benefits the agent by providing evidence that supports inferences as to which 
rules are not in the goal and it also provides additional positive exemplars of colours: e.g., 
if the agent believes rr,b
2
 is in the goal and a block o1 is placed on something which is almost 
certainly blue , then silence implies o1 is red. Exploiting silence as assent could also be used 
to learn concepts such as “gently”. An utterance such as “no, put that down gently” is by 
default said in a context where the agent’s action wasn’t gentle. However, if a subsequent 
Fig. 22  Mean of cumulative regret over 50 trials. Compares situations where the teacher either does or does 
not use anaphora. The agent additionally either updates on teacher silence or does not, as in the previous 
experiment
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put action involving the same object is executed and there’s no correction, then the agent 
might be able to infer that it’s a positive example of “put gently”.
6.3  Experiment 3
The third experiment tests the hypothesis that anaphora will lead to faster learning, thanks 
to the ways in which they can reduce overall ambiguity in the discourse (see Sect. 4.3 for 
discussion). We compare trials where the teacher uses anaphora against trials where she 
does not. We use the two types of learning agent from experiment 2. The results are shown 
in Fig. 22 and summarised in Table 4 with the difference in terminal regret visualised in 
Fig. 23. For the first trials, anaphora provides a very slight improvement, which is close to, 
but not quite, significant ( t = 2.4 , p = 0.16 ). However, in the third trial where two r1 and r2 
rules share colours, the improvement is large and highly significant ( t = 4.57 , p = 1.39e−5 ). 
This is supported by the evidence in Fig. 23. We see that the difference in terminal regret is 
higher in about 75% of runs for both the agents using Anaphora when we have both the r1 
and r2 rule, but for the other two experiments the median difference lies around 0 implying 
the Anaphora did not consistently help. These results are empirical evidence that exploiting 
anaphora doesn’t hurt, and indeed it can help in certain circumstances. The reason it is so 
helpful when both rx,y
1
 and rx,y
2
 are in the goal G is that by default the agent prefers explana-
tions where only one of these rules is in the goal, due to the low prior. The inference that 
the current feedback not only corrects the latest action but also elaborates on a prior error, 
which the coherent use of anaphora enforces, helps provide additional information to over-
ride a faulty, defeasible prior.
We’ve also shown that anaphora can be easily integrated into our framework, which is 
important for ITL since people frequently use anaphoric expressions. However, anaphora 
will not reduce ambiguity in all contexts: utterances such as “put them on green blocks” 
involves the difficulty of interpreting what “them” refers to. We leave dealing with this type 
of anaphora to future work and refer readers to, for example Williams and Scheutz [64] for 
further discussion on this topic.
Fig. 23  This box plot shows the difference in terminal regret comparing agents which use anaphor and do 
not use anaphor (with our without using assent). Positive values mean the No Anaphor agent had higher 
terminal regret than the Anaphor agent
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6.4  Experiment 4
In this paper we’ve exploited several semantic entailments of corrections to enhance task 
learning. However, corrections generate further entailments that require the agent to reason 
about the colours of blocks remaining on the table. For r1 and r2 rules, we have chosen to 
ignore these entailments, as we assumed the computational cost was too high compared to 
the benefit—exploiting such inferences makes the Bayes Net much less sparse, making the 
exponential complexity of exact inference a practical concern, not just a theoretical one. 
The introduction of r3 rules allow us to test this assumption. These rules generate correc-
tions with three monotonic semantic entailments that are associated with three levels of 
computational difficulty. The first is that the most recently placed object is of the relevant 
colour—thus adding one positive example of, say, red blocks. The cost of this is trivial, 
as there is only one non-zero probability option to consider. The second entailment is that 
Table 5  Mean Terminal Regret 
for agents using either the 
full evidence or the simplified 
evidence for problems with r 
r3 rules where the number of 
objects of allowed is n 
Problem Full Simplified
r = 1, n = 1 3.34 ± 0.39 4.08 ± 0.71
r = 1, n = 2 3.66 ± 1.17 5.28 ± 0.85
r = 1, n = 3 3.92 ± 1.40 6.12 ± 2.17
r = 2, n = 1 6.28 ± 1.67 8.08 ± 2.41
r = 2, n = 2 7.14 ± 1.22 10.32 ± 1.79
r = 2, n = 3 7.74 ± 1.13 11.74 ± 2.67
Fig. 24  Cumulative reward for experiments comparing agents which learn r3 rules either using the full 
monotonic entailment or a simplified inference. The trials vary the number of rules, r, in the goals, between 
1 and 2, and the maximum number of blocks of the constrained colour n between 1 and 3. The graphs show 
mean of regret over 50 trials
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there are n + 1 blocks of the relevant colour in the tower which violated the rule. If the 
agent infers which blocks these are, then it can add an additional n, noisy, data points to 
train the grounding model (as we did with the Language Agent in experiment 1). However, 
the computational cost is that 2t probability states must be evaluated, where t is the number 
of blocks in the tower. The final entailment is when the teacher tells the agent both r3 and 
r1 or r2 were violated. In this case, as we mentioned in Sect. 4.2, the agent can attempt to 
infer whether the violated rule is r1 or r2 by reasoning about all blocks on the table, to count 
whether there is one more block of one colour than the other. However, the computational 
cost for this inference is steep, it adds an additional 22b probability states, where b is the 
number of blocks on the table.
We implement these three strategies. Initial experiments with the third entailment 
showed that the computational cost was too high: the agent would consistently run out 
of memory trying to evaluate roughly 220 states. We call the remaining two strategies 
simplified for the first and full for the second. Figure 24 compares the performance of 
the simplified vs. full agents mean terminal regret summarised in Table  5. The num-
ber of rc,n
3
 rules is varied from varied from 1 to 2 and n is varied between 1 and 3. 
The full evidence provides a distinct benefit on cumulative regret for each type of trial, 
and Table 6 shows all these differences are significant. However, the benefit for rc,n
3
 is 
smaller than that for n = 2 and n = 3 . This may be because the number of additional 
Fig. 25  This box plot compares the difference in terminal regret between agents using the full evidence or 
simple evidence on r3 rules. A positive value means the agent using simple evidence had higher terminal 
regret than the agent using full evidence
Table 6  Results of t-tests comparing experiments for rc,n
3
 by either trying to estimate whether each of the 
blocks in the tower are the offending colour c or by just using the top block
The experiment was run with 1 or 2 rules of type rc,n
3
 where n varied between 1 and 3. For each experiment, 
the colours c for the rules are randomly selected from those that denote a relative large portion of the RGB 
spectrum
r/n 1 2 3
1 t = 4.52 , p = 3.9e − 5 t = 8.37 , p = 5.22e − 11 t = 9.70 , p = 5.46e − 13
2 t = 7.48 , p = 1.22e − 9 t = 9.01 , p = 5.75e − 12 t = 8.49 , p = 3.45e − 11
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data points that can be added to the grounding model depends on n: the higher the n, the 
more (noisy) data points a single correction provides. This is corroborated when look-
ing at Fig. 25 which shows the difference in terminal regret between the two agents in 
each of the experiments where the pattern of full evidence being an improvement con-
tinues and where more complex problems gain higher advantage.
It is clear from these experiments that performing the more difficult inference can be 
highly valuable, but we have also seen that some inferences are too costly. Designers of 
similar systems will have to consider this trade off and select for themselves which entail-
ments from linguistic signals to exploit, given their constraints. Additional computation 
time will lead to waiting time after feedback is given, which could cause human users to 
grow frustrated; however, they may become equally frustrated if they have to correct the 
agent for the same error several times. Ultimately all one can say is that there can be a 
marked difference in how quickly the agent learns, depending on which entailments are 
exploited.
7  Conclusion
In this paper, we exploited the semantics of coherent discourse to jointly learn three tasks 
via natural language interaction with a teacher: how to refine an agents domain model to 
include unforeseen concepts as and when they are discovered via neologisms in the inter-
action; how to ground the domain model’s symbols to visual features; and how to infer a 
correct goal description, so as to construct valid sequential plans. We focused on a type of 
dialogue move that has so far been under utilised in ITL: namely, corrective feedback, in 
which the teacher expresses the nature of the mistake that the learner has made in its latest 
action. We showed that in spite of the teacher’s natural language signals being semanti-
cally ambiguous and also featuring neologisms whose denotations are not a part of the 
agent’s domain model, the agent can nevertheless exploit discourse coherence to learn how 
to compute the speaker’s intended message, ground it via its visual percepts, and solve 
its planning problem. Our approach generates a graphical model ‘on the fly’ whenever 
there is observable evidence, with the dependencies and parameters determined by estab-
lished semantic constraints on coherent discourse within the linguistics literature ([8, 29, 
37], e.g.,). These models force the probability of incoherent interpretations of an utterance 
to be zero, thus ensuring the agent makes inferences consistent with the coherence of the 
dialogue. We have shown how to construct this graphical model for corrections, implied 
assent, and simple anaphoric expressions.
We evaluate our approach with four sets of experiments. We show that our agent 
outperforms a baseline which only learns from the teacher saying “no”, even though her 
message is latent because the linguistic forms feature neologisms and semantic scope 
ambiguities. We also show that making use of the teacher’s implied assent when she 
is silent and her use of anaphoric expressions improves how quickly the agent learns. 
Finally, we explore the trade-off between exploiting a monotonic semantic consequence 
of a coherence relation on the one hand, and the size of the search space that’s needed 
to verify that this semantic consequence is satisfied by the current domain state on the 
other. For some entailments, it is completely impractical to learn from them without 
running out of memory: the number of dependencies that must be added to the Bayes 
Net to reflect certain monotonic entailments of the message creates a situation where 
exponential exact inference is a practical impediment, not just a theoretical one. For 
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other entailments, however, exploiting them can improve the agent’s performance with 
respect to cumulative regret, but the time required to perform the necessary inferences 
is longer and may lead to the system becoming frustrating for human teachers. Overall, 
exploiting the semantics of discourse coherence is useful, indeed critical; but the system 
designer shouldn’t feel compelled to exploit every semantic entailment as evidence: one 
needs to find an optimal trade off between data efficiency during learning vs. processing 
time and memory.
While we’ve shown a promising approach for exploiting discourse coherence to ITL, 
there are still several questions that need to be addressed before the approach is ready to 
be deployed with real humans. Firstly, we show our approach works for grounding col-
ours; however, any real scenario will involve more challenging grounding problems, which 
require more sophisticated grounding models. Our grounding models are in principle 
replaceable with any state of the art technique, so long as it outputs a probability distribu-
tion and can support incremental updates and noisy training data. But the effects on perfor-
mance are clearly an empirical matter. We also consider only very specific types of plan-
ning problems. For instance, the actions we consider are reversible, i.e. we can return to 
the state before the action was executed by using some other action, such as unstack. Our 
learning models don’t rely on the actions being reversible, but the current implementation 
does, which means it is an empirical question as to whether the method would still work 
in other conditions. As we mentioned in Sect. 3, planning problems where actions aren’t 
reversible are generally more computationally complex to solve than planning problems 
where they are, and we have yet to investigate how the models we’ve developed here will 
scale when the planning problems to be solved are more complex.
Secondly, we focused on a simple dialogue strategy: when a rule (or combination of 
rules) in the goal G is violated, the teacher corrects the agent by expressing, albeit in a 
potentially ambiguous way, which part of G is violated. But while this strategy is sim-
ple to express, listing all conditions under which a rule (or combination of rules) is vio-
lated is non-trivial, and it may not scale easily to increase the type of constraints we cover. 
An ideal solution would be to use automated theorem proving, model builders and model 
checkers to automatically generate the valid hypothesis space given an arbitrary new con-
straint, something we intend to investigate further in future work. Thirdly, we assumed 
that the teacher and learner share common knowledge about their dialogue strategy. But 
in natural human dialogue, the coherence relation that connects a speaker’s utterance to its 
context isn’t observable [8, 30]. So in a general system, discourse parsing will be necessary 
(e.g., [1, 46]), and in contrast to the assumptions in this paper its estimates of coherence 
relations may be wrong. Additionally, when it comes to exploiting the teacher’s silence 
as assent, there is a significant challenge to overcome in face to face communication of 
actually detecting when the teacher is implying assent and when they simply aren’t paying 
attention or perhaps are slow to react or are quiet for any other reason. We skirt around this 
by acting in a virtual environment, giving the teacher time to react to each action. But in 
order to deploy our system in an embodied setting with human teachers, the model would 
have to be updated to deal with these problems.
Finally, our model assumes the teacher is infallible: always coherent, sincere and com-
petent. In future work, we plan to address uncertainty about the coherence relations and 
imperfect teachers by refining the graphical models generated from observable evidence 
and adjusting their prior probabilities.
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